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Abstract 
This article focuses on Makerere University and Kyambogo University 
to highlight stakeholders’ concerns pertaining to the shared governance 
framework for public universities in Uganda. It is anchored in the interpre- 
tivist lens and the data was derived from three state-sponsored reports on 
the two public universities. The secondary data was analysed using content 
analysis. The findings demonstrate that the size, composition, authority 
and effectiveness of the university council and the senate and the mode 
through which leaders assume office, are the salient governance con- 
cerns in the two universities. The results further show that, stakeholders’ 
concerns regarding the current shared governance framework for public 
universities relate to the substance of the framework rather than its form 
or the framework itself. This suggests that the governance framework com- 
prising the university council, the university senate and the administration 
is fit for purpose and in sync with the nature of the academy. Arguably, 
these governance organs (and the nature of their work) set a university 
apart from other organisations. Finally, without being prescriptive, the 
article sketches options for reform. 
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Le présent article se concentre sur l’Université de Makerere et l’Université 
de Kyambogo pour mettre en lumière l’inquiétude des parties prenantes au 
sujet du modèle de gouvernance partagée dans les universités publiques 
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en Ouganda. Il adopte un point de vue interprétativiste et s’appuie sur des 
données issues de trois rapports commandités par l’Etat sur ces deux uni- 
versités publiques. Les données secondaires ont été traitées par une analyse 
de contenu. Les résultats démontrent que la taille, la composition, l’autorité 
et l’efficacité du conseil universitaire et du sénat de l’université, et la façon 
dont les dirigeants exercent leurs fonctions sont les principaux sujets 
d’inquiétude en ce qui concerne la gouvernance de ces deux universités. 
Les résultats démontrent également que les inquiétudes des parties pre- 
nantes au sujet du modèle actuel de gouvernance partagée des universités 
publiques porte sur le contenu de ce modèle, plus que sur sa forme ou sur 
le modèle lui-même. Cela montre que le modèle de gouvernance qui com- 
prend le conseil universitaire, le sénat de l’université et l’administration 
répond aux attentes et est en cohérence avec l’environnement académique. 
On peut considérer que ces organes de gouvernance (et la nature de leur 
travail) différencient l’université d’autres types d’organisations. Enfin, sans 
aucune intention normative, cet article ébauche des possibilités de réforme. 
 
Mots clés : gouvernance partagée, inquiétudes, universités publiques, défis, 
économies de transition 
 
Introduction 
Many of my university president (vice chancellor or rector) col- 
leagues – particularly those associated with public universities 
– believe that the greatest challenge and threat to their institutions 
arises from the manner in which their institutions are governed, 
both from within and from without. (James J. Duderstadt [2002], 
President Emeritus, the University of Michigan) 
Over the past three decades or so, debate on governance in general and 
shared governance in particular, has gained traction in higher education 
(Bleiklie and Kogan, 2007; Dearlove, 2002; Morphew, 1999; Rowlands, 
2011, 2012, 2017; Rowlands and Ngo, 2018; Shattock, 2014; Trakman, 
2008). A tripartite arrangement which “allocates public accountability and 
stewardship to the governing board, academic matters to the faculty, and the 
tasks of managing the institution to administration” (Duderstadt, 2002:4), 
shared governance is among the topical issues in the international higher 
education policy discourse. The emergence of New Public Management 
(NPM) or managerialism and the massification of higher education in the 
1980s (Rowlands, 2017; Shattock, 2008; Taylor, 2013) elevated governance 
to a topical concern in higher education and ignited governance reforms in 
universities across the globe. Globally, universities and higher education 
systems are experimenting with new governance models to enable uni- 
versities to respond to changing needs and emerging societal challenges 
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(Duderstadt, 2002; Mehan, 2016; Saint, 2009). Reforms were fuelled, and 
continue to be fuelled, by perceptions among stakeholders that: (a) univer- 
sities were not responsive enough to changes in the external environment 
because they relied on collegial governance that is sluggish in decision- 
making (owing to seeking consensus through committees); (b) universities 
were conservative, biased in favour of the status quo, and inward-looking 
(Dearlove, 2002; Duderstadt, 2002); and (c) academics incessantly exhib- 
ited obstructionist tendencies (Birnbaum, 2004). 
Studies on governance in higher education have burgeoned since the 
1980s  (Amaral,  Jones  and  Karseth,  2002;  Bleiklie  and  Kogan,  2007; 
Knight,  2002;  Marginson  and  Considine,  2000;  Middlehurst,  2004, 
2013; Minor, 2004; Rowlands, 2011, 2012, 2017; Shattock, 1999, 2008, 
2013, 2014; Taylor, 2013; Trakman, 2008). However, most focus on higher 
education systems in the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Similarly, extant studies on shared 
governance models (see Rowlands and Ngo, 2018; Taylor, 2013) hinge on 
higher education systems in the UK, the US and Australia and draw con- 
clusions which are of a general nature. While research has been conducted 
on higher education governance in Africa, current scholarship leans more 
towards the governance of higher education systems (e.g., Kasozi, 2016; 
Melu, 2016), documents the post-1990s governance reforms undertaken 
in African countries (e.g., Saint, 2009; Sall and Oanda; Varghese, 2013, 
2016), examines the functions of the governance organs in higher edu- 
cation institutions (e.g., Hall, Symes and Luescher, 2002; Olweny, 2015; 
Saint, 2009) and analyses broader governance challenges such as funding, 
accountability,  infrastructure,  trust  and  regulation  but  not  within  the 
framework of shared governance (e.g., Bigab, Forson, Abotsi and Baah- 
Ennumh, 2018). 
There is thus a dearth of empirical studies on higher education stake- 
holders’ concerns regarding the size and composition, authority, efficacy 
and general outcomes of the shared governance architecture within public 
universities in Africa generally and in Uganda in particular. Against this 
backdrop, this article examines stakeholders’ concerns associated with the 
prevailing shared governance framework in public universities in Uganda. 
The article comprises five sections. Following this introductory section, 
the next section reviews the literature on governance in higher education. 
The third section sketches the shared governance architecture for public 
universities in Uganda, and is followed by the section outlining the meth- 
odology. The final section presents the findings on shared governance 
concerns in public universities in Uganda, and compares them to the coun- 
try’s legal framework for higher education and extant literature. 
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2. University Governance: Meaning and Models 
There is a plethora of definitions of university governance. Eurydice 
(2008, P.12) defines university governance as “the formal and informal 
exercise of authority under laws, policies and rules that articulate the rights 
and responsibilities of various actors, including the rules by which they 
interact.” Neave (2006, P.28) conceptualises it as “a conceptual shorthand 
for the way higher education… institutions are organised and managed.” 
Finally, Marginson and Considine (2000, p.7) consider university gover- 
nance to encompass: 
…the determination of value inside the universities, their systems of 
decision-making and resource allocation, their missions and purpose, 
the patterns of authority and hierarchy, and the relationship of uni- 
versities as institutions to different academic worlds within and the 
worlds of government, business and community without. 
Decision-making is a key tenet of university governance. Consistent with 
this, Toma (2007, p. 57) views governance in general and university gover- 
nance in particular as a matter of “responding to the question: who makes 
what decisions?” 
Models of governance in public universities can be nested into three 
forms: unicameral, bicameral and tricameral (Olweny, 2015; Rowlands, 
2017). In a unicameral system, a single governing body is responsible 
for determining the academic and financial matters of a university (Dear- 
love, 2002; Rowlands, 2017). The academic senate derives its authority 
from the university council. Operationally, the academic body functions 
as a committee of the university council and its recommendations are 
subject to approval by the council. In exceptional circumstances, some 
academic bodies have the latitude to determine certain academic matters 
in their own right but on the basis of formal delegation of authority by 
the university council (Rowlands, 2017). Conversely, in a bicameral gov- 
ernance model, the university has two governing bodies (Amaral, Jones 
and Karseth, 2002), each of which has ultimate decision-making authority: 
the senate for academic matters and the university council for financial 
matters  (Giovanna,  2013;  Rowlands,  2017).  A  bicameral  governance 
arrangement is intended to “protect academics from lay intervention into 
academic affairs” (Shattock, 1999, p. 277) and to “balance the needs for 
external accountability to the state... with the need for the participation of 
the professoriate in decisions” that hinge on academic standards (Amaral, 
Jones and Karseth, 2002, p.16). As the name suggests, tricameralism 
comprises three parts: the board of trustees, the senate and the university 
council (Olweny, 2015). The board of trustees is charged with oversight of 
financial management and planning; the academic senate determines aca- 
demic matters and finally, the university council is entrusted with matters 
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relating to the wellbeing of the university and overseeing the election of 
the chancellor and rectors. 
Prior to the 1980s, universities were governed under the collegial or 
self-governance model (Giovanna, 2013; Saint, 2009). This model was 
dominant in the UK where the senate, which was comprised largely of 
the professoriate, was the pinnacle of power and influence in a university 
(Rowlands, 2017; Shattock, 2008; Taylor, 2013; Trakman, 2008). From the 
1940s to the late 1970s, the norm in public universities in the UK was that 
“no governing body would act in a major policy issue without consulting 
the senate and most policy issues were in practice initiated at the senate 
level” (Shattock, 2014, p. 127). The prevalent perception at the time was that 
only academics were “sufficiently qualified to regulate the public affairs of 
scholars” (Moodie and Eustace, 1974, p. 233). This epitomised the view that 
the university was a “republic of scholars”. Within the collegial governance 
model, the vice chancellor was elected by the senate from among the uni- 
versity’s “most esteemed scholars to fulfil ceremonial and administrative 
duties” (Saint, 2009, P.2) as a primus inter pares (first among equals). 
The emergence of NPM and the shift from elite to mass higher edu- 
cation ignited unprecedented changes in governance arrangements for 
public universities in the UK and other jurisdictions (Rowlands, 2017). 
More specifically, the transnational ideas of NPM orchestrated an erosion 
of  confidence  in  the  self-governance  model  in  universities  while  mas- 
sification  occasioned  reduced  government  funding  per  student  and  a 
phenomenal increase in the number of students. The model was deemed 
to have outlived its usefulness because of the imperative to “develop and 
maintain flexibility and dynamism in governance and to be alert to shifts in 
the external environment” (Taylor, 2013, p. 91). New Public Management 
and massification contributed to calls for universities to operate as busi- 
ness entities with a view to enhancing income. This precipitated a shift 
of power from senates to governing bodies which were composed, in the 
main, of independent and external lay members with a particular focus on 
legal, financial and business expertise (Rowlands, 2017). 
 
3. Context of Public Higher Education in Uganda 
The evolution of higher education in Uganda can be traced to the establish- 
ment of Makerere University in 1922 that began life as a technical college 
(Mamdani, 2007) and assumed the status of a university college affiliated 
to the University of London in 1949 (Bisaso, 2017). Under the affiliation 
arrangement, Makerere University offered academic programmes leading 
to the general degrees of the University of London (Nabaho, Aguti and 
Oonyu, 2017). The arrangement was severed in 1963 when Makerere Uni- 
versity became one of the three constituent colleges of the University of 
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East Africa following Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya’s independence. In 
1970, by an Act of Parliament, the University became an independent uni- 
versity of the Republic of Uganda. 
The post-1980s era has witnessed a proliferation of both public and 
private universities in Uganda (Bisaso, 2017). The country’s current higher 
education landscape comprises of eight public universities and one public 
other degree-awarding institution. The table below shows these universi- 
ties and the year when each was established. 
 
Table 1. Public Universities in Uganda 
 
No. University Year of establishment Status 
1. Makerere University 1922 University 
2. Mbarara University of Science and 
Technology 
1989 University 
3. Kyambogo University 2003 University 
4. Gulu University 2002 University 
5. Kabale University 2005 University 
6. Busitema University 2007 University 
7. Muni University 2013 University 
8. Soroti University 2015 University 
9. Uganda Management Institute 1969 Other Degree 
Awarding Institution 
 
Source: National Council for Higher Education website 
 
Public universities in Uganda are governed under the Universities and 
other Tertiary Institutions Act (UOTIA) (2001). A hallmark of the UOTIA 
is the shift from “direct steering of higher education by the government to 
granting the institutional autonomy of public universities” (Bisaso, 2017, 
p. 423). The UOTIA established the National Council for Higher Educa- 
tion (NCHE) as the regulatory body for higher education and mandated 
the  council  to,  among  other  things,  accredit  private  higher  education 
institutions  (and  their  academic  programmes)  and  to  recommend  the 
establishment of a public university to the minister responsible for educa- 
tion. The senate and the university council are firmly entrenched in the 
UOTIA. The council of a public university is responsible for the direction 
of its administrative, financial and academic affairs. On the other hand, the 
senate is the principal academic authority. In its relationship with the uni- 
versity council, the senate plays both decision-making and advisory roles, 
but specifically on academic questions. It is an embodiment of self-gover- 
nance and external guidance because it is composed of internal members 
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(academics, administrative staff and students’ representatives) and three 
external members. However, the academic governance organ is dominated 
by the academic oligarchy from within the university. The vice chancellor is 
the chairperson of the senate while the academic registrar is its secretary. 
Makerere University can be analysed in terms of the evolution of higher 
education in Uganda and as one of the public universities in the country. 
It is the oldest university in Uganda and East Africa and in 2011 it transi- 
tioned from a faculty-based to a collegiate university (Bisaso, 2017). The 
university comprises ten colleges which are structured into schools and 
teaching departments (Nabaho, 2017). By 2013, Makerere University had a 
student population of 40,000 undergraduate and 3,000 postgraduate stu- 
dents, constituting 53 percent of enrolment in public universities in Uganda 
(Makerere University, 2013). As at December 2012, the university had about 
1,600 academic staff (Makerere University, 2013). Kyambogo University is 
the second largest public university in Uganda. It was established in 2003 
by an Act of Parliament following the merger of three institutions (Uganda 
Polytechnic Kyambogo [1928], the Institute of Teacher Education Kyam- 
bogo [1945] and the Uganda National Institute of Special Education [1988]). 
It consists of seven faculties. 
 
4. Methods 
The study was anchored in the interpretivist approach and employed docu- 
ment review to collect data. Three reports on higher education in Uganda 
were reviewed with a view to identifying governance concerns, namely, the 
Report of the Taskforce on Job Evaluation, Re-organisation of the Staff Struc- 
ture  and  Financing  of  Makerere  University,  2014  (informally referred to as 
the Omaswa Taskforce Report); the Report on Investigations into Mismanage- 
ment and Corruption at Kyambogo University, 2015 (herein referred to as the 
Inspectorate of Government [IG] Report); and the Report of the Visitation 
Committee on Makerere University (or the Rwendeire Report). In addition, 
an article that appeared in The  Observer  newspaper (March 27-28, 2017) 
entitled “Ddumba-Ssentamu out of Mak (Makerere University) VC [vice 
chancellor] race” was found to be an appropriate data source because it 
contains an interview with the then vice chancellor of Makerere University 
and the principal of one of the colleges and focuses on governance at the 
university. 
The IG Report was the outcome of a resolution of the Parliament of 
Uganda on 12 November 2012 requesting the Ombudsman to probe the 
affairs of Kyambogo University. On the other hand, the Omaswa Taskforce 
was constituted by the Chairperson of the Makerere University Council at 
the request of the Government of Uganda against the backdrop of endemic 
strikes at Makerere University which some stakeholders attribute to gover- 
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nance issues. The first term of reference for the task force was to “review 
the current macro and micro organizational structures of the University 
towards recommending the most suitable structure for the University to 
operate efficiently” (Report of the Taskforce on Job Evaluation, Re-organisa- 
tion of the Staff Structure and Financing of Makerere University, 2014, p. xi). 
Chapter four of the report hinges on governance and management. 
Finally, the Visitation Committee on Makerere University was consti- 
tuted in November 2016 by the head of state in his capacity as the Visitor 
of Makerere University. Among its terms of reference was to “ …visit, study 
and make a situation analysis of Makerere University and [the] causes of 
endemic strikes including but not limited to academic affairs, financial 
affairs, governance affairs, and student affairs, and make recommenda- 
tions” (Report of the Visitation Committee on Makerere University, p. xiv). The 
third chapter of the report is dedicated to governance and management 
within the university. 
Despite the findings in the three reports being specific to particular insti- 
tutions, the recommendations have ramifications for the governance of all 
public universities since they are governed under the same legal frame- 
work. It is, therefore, not surprising that the recommendations relate to the 
amendment of Uganda’s (public) higher education legal framework. 
Content  analysis  –  “a  research  technique  for  making  replicable  and 
valid inferences from text (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of 
their use” (Krippendorff, 2004:18-19) – was employed to analyse the data. 
Qualitative content analysis examines the language in a text for the purpose 
of classifying large amounts of text into categories that represent similar 
meaning (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). The reports were reviewed using 
inductive content analysis. Open coding was used, where notes and head- 
ings were written in the reports while reading them. Categories and themes 
were derived from the notes. 
 
5. Results  and Discussion 
This section presents and analyses the stakeholders’ concerns associated 
with the shared governance framework for public universities in Uganda 
that were distilled from the IG, Omaswa and Rwendeire Reports. Without 
being prescriptive, it also suggests options for reforming the shared 
governance arrangement for Uganda’s public universities. The shared 
governance concerns can be nested in three broad themes: corporate gov- 
ernance concerns; academic governance concerns; and concerns regarding 
the mode of assumption of office by leaders. 
 
Corporate Governance Concerns 
The stakeholders’ concerns regarding corporate governance in public 
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universities centre on the size, composition and efficacy of the university 
council as well as its authority. 
 
Size, composition and efficacy of the university council 
The size and composition of the university council has attracted criticism 
from a spectrum of stakeholders in the higher education sub-sector. This is 
evident in parallel comments on this issue in the IG Report on Kyambogo 
University (2015), the Omaswa Report on Makerere University (2014) and 
the Rwendeire Report (2017) on Makerere University. The first area of con- 
vergence is the bloated size of the university council. The IG Report (2015) 
observed: 
Respondents  interviewed  by  the  IG  [Inspectorate  of  Government] 
investigation team were unanimously of the view that the current 
composition of the University Council is unwieldy. Council is also 
dominated by members of staff of the University, at least 16 of the 
total number [30], making it difficult to take firm decisions towards 
streamlining the administration of the University. This is especially so 
if the proposed plan of action is not in the interests of the members 
of staff. (Report of Investigations into Mismanagement and Corruption at 
Kyambogo University, 2015, p. 57) 
The Omaswa and Rwendeire Reports also faulted the size of the Maker- 
ere University council. The three reports make proposals to trim the size of 
the governing body. The IG Report recommended: “[The] UOTIA should 
be amended in order to reduce numbers of the members of the Univer- 
sity Council” (Report of Investigations into Mismanagement and Corruption 
at  Kyambogo  University, 2015, p. 118). On the other hand, the Omaswa 
Report recommended trimming the size of the university council from 24 
to 13 members, all of whom would be external stakeholders, save the vice 
chancellor who is envisaged to be an ex-officio member. This would entail 
the adoption of a purely corporatist model of governance and an erosion 
of the vestiges of self-governance. In contrast, the Rwendeire Report pro- 
poses a university council of 15 members, of whom nine would be external 
stakeholders. The internal stakeholders, who would be ex-officio members, 
include the vice chancellor, and a single representative of the students, 
convocation, teaching staff, support staff and graduate students of the uni- 
versity. 
The second parallel in all the reports relates to the question of whether 
representation of various constituencies on the university council is still 
relevant in the 21th  century. The three reports answer this question in the 
negative and propose a shift from representative democracy to meritocracy 
as a criterion for membership of the university council. Representative 
democracy is faulted for overshadowing merit. The proposed policy change 
54     lAZARus NABAHo 
 
 
 
is buttressed by the idea that representative democracy breeds straw people 
whose experience is either limited or decoupled from higher education 
and whose commitment to such education may be questionable.  Based 
on the bold observations in the IG and Omaswa reports, a spectator could 
infer that the governing bodies of public universities are not as good as the 
institutions they serve. Excerpts from the two reports give credence to this 
inference. Based on the experience of public universities, the IG Report 
observed: 
Respondents were also unanimously of the view that the majority of 
members of [University] Councils do not have vast or any experience 
in the management of higher education and in many cases they are 
unionists pushing for the interests of their constituencies. (Report of 
Investigations into Mismanagement and Corruption at Kyambogo Univer- 
sity, 2015, p. 57) 
In the same report, a respondent is quoted as saying that members of 
the Kyambogo University Council know “…little about what a University is 
or how it should be governed. More so, many [council members] possess 
low academic qualifications. These are more of participatory members with 
no technical knowledge at all” (Report of Investigations into Mismanagement 
and Corruption at Kyambogo University, 2015, p. 65). Indeed, perceptions of 
the lack of fitness of purpose of university councils go beyond Kyambogo 
University. After attending two university council meetings, the Omaswa 
Report concluded: 
The taskforce also observed that the quality of debate, decorum and deci- 
sions made in some cases did not undergo the critical rigour expected 
of an institution of the calibre of Makerere University. (Taskforce  on 
Job  Evaluation,  Re-organisation  of  the  Staff  Structure  and  Financing  of 
Makerere University, 2014, p. 43) 
To salvage the situation, the IG Report proposes a university council that 
is non-representative and competence-based: 
[The] UOTIA should be amended in order to… specify persons with 
the relevant technical skills and knowledge to become members of the 
Council to replace the broad based organ representing constituencies 
that the Council is at present. (Report of Investigations into Mismanage- 
ment and Corruption at Kyambogo University, 2015, p. 118) 
Coincidentally, the Omaswa Report recommends: 
… the University Council should consist of 13 members including the 
VC [vice chancellor] with the following skills profiles: (i) past or present 
holders of responsible positions in society, (ii) notable personalities in 
Academia, Teaching and Research, (iii) exceptional knowledge, expe- 
rience and commitment to the pursuit of knowledge and intellectual 
inquiry, (iv) commitment to advance knowledge generation and con- 
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tribution of Higher Education to national development, and (v) high 
moral standing and integrity in society. The Task Force proposes that 
the 13 members be selected from the following skills sets: Finance; 
Legal; Higher Education; Industry; Science and Technology; Human 
Resource; Business/Private Sector; and Alumni. (Taskforce on Job Eval- 
uation, Re-organisation of the Staff Structure and Financing of Makerere 
University, 2014, p. 122) 
It is important to note the skills profiles and skills sets suggested. The 
skills profiles in the IG Report allude to four essential attributes for members 
of a 21st  century university council: an understanding of the nature of the 
university as an organisation and the nexus between the university and 
society; reasonable commitment to higher education; demonstrable expe- 
rience with higher education; and exceptional experience with the triple 
mission of the university (teaching, research and service) or the experience 
of toiling in the vineyard of teaching, scholarship and service. A univer- 
sity council whose entire membership meets these attributes is likely to be 
more predisposed towards matters of education policy than general admin- 
istrative issues, to advocate for higher education, and to uphold and defend 
the ethos of academic freedom and rigorous inquiry, among others. It is 
arguable that such a university council would not perennially depend on 
the strategic guidance of the vice chancellor. On the other hand, the skills 
set points to the need to ensure a sufficient balance of skills and experi- 
ence among the members of the university council. Reference to industry 
and the business/private sector could be intended to promote linkages or 
collaboration between industry/business and the academy. In view of the 
above, it can be inferred that a university cannot rise above the quality of 
its governing body. 
The discourse on the size and composition of councils of public uni- 
versities elicits a number of options for reform, each with its merits and 
demerits. The first option is to drastically reduce the number of university 
employees who sit on the governing body. This is proposed in all three 
reports. Reduced staff representation would tilt the numerical strength in 
favour of external and independent members. This reform option would, 
therefore, preserve the vestiges of self-governance and also make it easy 
for policies that are unpalatable to the internal university community to be 
passed. The second option, which is explicit in the Omaswa Report, is to 
end the era of student and academic voices in corporate governance. The 
final option is to take cognisance of the voices of students and academics 
but to confine their participation to committees of the university council. 
It is apparent that the Omaswa Report is unequivocal on the complete 
adoption of corporate-style university councils which, by implication, ends 
the representation of students and academics in corporate governance. 
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However, there is a lack of convergence between these recommendations 
and extant literature. The literature is generally averse to excluding academ- 
ics from corporate governance (e.g., Dearlove, 2002; Taylor, 2013). Despite 
variations in context, the diametrically opposed perspectives on the sensi- 
tive governance question leave the Ugandan policymaker in a dilemma, 
i.e., whether to find solace in the two reports or in extant literature. Dear- 
love (2002, p. 270) subscribes to the inclusion of academics in governance 
and rationalises this by stating that “…academic involvement in governance 
and management is fundamental given that institutions geared to teaching 
and research can hardly bypass the people who do these things.” Simi- 
larly, Birnbaum (2004, p. 8) cautions against exclusion by asserting that 
“… governance and institutional purposes are related… and proposals that 
suggest, either explicitly or implicitly, that the faculty role in shared gover- 
nance should be reduced or limited are more likely to diminish rather than 
improve institutional effectiveness.” Finally, Taylor (2013, p. 92) cautions 
universities about the dangers of excluding academics from participation 
in governance: 
A university is unlikely to succeed without the cooperation and active 
engagement of its academics; and centralisation of decision making 
to the exclusion of academics is likely to reinforce academics’ natural 
tendency towards a stronger allegiance to their discipline than to their 
institution and to foster academic alienation from institutional strategy 
and objectives. 
In answering the question of whether or not academics should partici- 
pate in corporate governance, it is prudent for policymakers in transitional 
economies to borrow lessons from the experience of advanced economies 
– the variation in context notwithstanding – that have mutated from inclu- 
sion to exclusion, and later from exclusion to inclusion. Rowlands (2017) 
reports that, in Australia, from 2013 until recently, students and staff 
were excluded from university councils and that the new Labour govern- 
ment introduced legislation designed to restore their membership. This 
suggests that the implementers of neo-liberal ideals should be sensitive 
to the unique nature and values of the university. Although the intention 
of the proposals in the Omaswa Report is to enhance institutional effec- 
tiveness, they may inadvertently undermine it by excluding academics 
from corporate governance. It is for this reason that the practice of student 
and academic staff representation on the university council persists. The 
Rwendeire Report takes cognisance of this school of thought not only in 
terms of representation on the university council but also in using academ- 
ics’ expertise in corporate governance. Therefore, the current global trend 
that favours a managerial mode with a smaller number of members of the 
university and a majority of external representatives (Fielden, 2008; Saint, 
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2009; Kasozi, 2016) could be considered for public universities in Uganda. 
The notion of a competence-based council comprising people from a 
diversity of fields such as law, finance, accounting, business and industry 
finds favour among stakeholders and is consistent with extant literature 
(see OECD, 2003; Rowlands, 2017). This is anchored in the perception that 
governing bodies comprised of lay citizens, with little knowledge of either 
academic matters or the complex financial, management and legal affairs 
of the university, cannot provide competent oversight of universities (Dud- 
erstadt, 2002). 
 
Authority of the University Council 
The Omaswa Report raises concerns about the state’s erosion of “…the 
authority of the [Makerere] University Council” (Taskforce on Job Evaluation, 
Re-organisation of the Staff Structure and Financing of Makerere University, 
2014, p. 43) and cites several examples to corroborate this assertion: 
This was evidenced by a tendency of University students and staff 
to rush to H.E. the President, Ministry of Education and Sports and 
Parliament to express their concerns on different issues before first 
exhausting them at the level of the University Council. Resolutions 
of the Council are not routinely implemented; one example being the 
disregard of Council directive to have all students pay fees on time. 
Further, political interference on setting fee levels, collecting fees, and 
bypassing Council in dealing with staff issues by other authorities; has 
contributed to the erosion of the authority of the University Council. 
(Taskforce on Job Evaluation, Re-organisation of the Staff Structure and 
Financing of Makerere University, 2014, pp. 43-44) 
The UOTIA envisages a situation where the state would steer uni- 
versities from a distance. Evidence suggests that a new trend of state 
micro-management of universities has emerged (Taskforce on Job Evalu- 
ation,  Re-organisation  of  the  Staff  Structure  and  Financing  of  Makerere 
University,  2014). This often happens in cases where governing bodies 
take legitimate decisions but the state feels that such decisions may either 
diminish its electoral fortunes or have security ramifications. A danger- 
ous trend has also emerged where students have assumed the de  facto 
mandate of “vetoing” decisions of the university council, especially those 
that have financial implications such as fees increments, timely payment 
of fees and outsourcing of catering services. For example, the university 
has had to suspend or stay the implementation of some council direc- 
tives because of student unrest or the threat of such unrest. In view of the 
above, it would be fallacious to imagine that the university council holds 
(real) power and authority – real authority resides with the students and 
at the presidency. The solution to this problem lies in the state granting 
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space to the overseers of universities to govern, subject to state supervision 
rather than interference. 
 
Academic Governance Concerns 
Stakeholders’ concerns relating to academic governance, particularly the 
university senate include the size of the senate, and its composition and 
efficacy. The Omaswa Report deemed the senate of Makerere University to 
be bloated (87 members) and recommended slashing it to 60 members, 
comprising the vice chancellor and deputy vice chancellors, principals of 
colleges, directors of academic units and representatives of affiliated col- 
leges. The report further proposes, inter alia, a reduction in government 
representatives from three to one, and the exclusion of students and non- 
academic employees of the university from the academic governance body. 
This proposed shift envisages a senate that is a true reflection of collegial- 
ity. However, the report takes cognisance of the student voice in academic 
governance and, therefore, recommends their representation in another 
forum, such as the student affairs committee of the university senate. 
The final concern in both reports is associated with the efficacy of the 
academic body in executing its statutory roles. A plethora of quality deficits 
that are likely to impinge (or are impinging) on the image of both universi- 
ties – including, but not limited to, poorly designed academic programmes, 
duplication of programmes, examination leakages and malpractices, and 
delays in releasing examination results – feature in the IG and Omaswa 
Reports. These quality concerns are evidence, albeit contestable, of the inef- 
fectiveness of the senate in executing its statutory mandate. 
The senate is recognised in both reports as the custodian of academic 
standards, the protector of academic integrity and the guarantor of the 
quality of education provided by the university. Nevertheless, the data shows 
that the senates of both universities are ineffective in providing oversight 
of teaching, learning and research activities. Previous studies (Baird, 2007; 
Birnbaum, 2004; Moodie, 2004; Rowlands, 2012, 2014) attest to the inef- 
fectiveness of university senates. At both universities, this could be due to 
the quality of membership and the lack of executive powers. It is, there- 
fore, not surprising that existing literature on revitalising senates suggests 
that they be restructured with a view to ensuring that they are “made up of 
acknowledged experts and leaders that could better discharge quality assur- 
ance functions and assist in holding others accountable for the achievement 
of the institution’s strategies” (Baird and Woodhouse, 2007, p. 10). 
 
Concerns regarding the mode of assumption of office by leaders 
The UOTIA provides an elaborate mechanism for electing leaders from the 
vice chancellor to heads of teaching departments. The current mechanism 
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attests to the complementary roles of the university council and the senate 
in some appointments but assigns final decisions to the university council. 
Concerning the appointment of the vice chancellor, two members of the 
university council and three members of the senate constitute the search 
committee. This committee advertises the job, shortlists and assesses the 
candidates, and forwards the selected candidates’ names and details to the 
senate. The senate is statutorily required to recommend three candidates 
to the university council. The vice chancellor is appointed by the chancel- 
lor on the recommendation of the university council from among three 
candidates recommended by the senate (UOTIA, 2001). The appointment 
is for five years but the vice chancellor is eligible for re-appointment for a 
further term. 
The senate elects the deputy vice chancellor and principals of colleges of 
the university but the elected candidates are subject to the approval of the 
university council. Deans and heads of departments are elected at school 
and departmental levels, respectively in line with procedures prescribed 
by the senate and are appointed by the university council. They serve for a 
period of four years and are eligible to serve one more consecutive term. 
The practice of electing leaders has both enthusiasts and critics. The 
former, who are mainly academics, are of the view that it affords them an 
opportunity to exercise their democratic right. Conversely, critics cite the 
negative aspects of this approach including, inter alia, localisation of the 
labour market (exclusion of external candidates) in the case of deans and 
heads of departments; sacrificing merit on the altar of ethnicity, corruption 
and religion; the emergence of bad leaders; polarisation of the university; 
inadvertently promoting ill-discipline amongst staff; subordination of the 
general interest to the interests of the electorate; and a decline in the quality 
of education. This is evident in the excerpt below: 
The Makerere experience demonstrated that the method of election of 
leadership… is prone to corruption and too much politics. It invokes 
religious and tribal bigotry and tends to polarize the staff of the institu- 
tion. For instance, the 2012 process of selection of the Vice chancellor 
brought out the worst of Makerere, badly polarized the institution and 
did great harm to the reputation of the Institution. Further, it was 
observed that the electorate expected candidates to commit to certain 
undertakings some of which were not in the interest of the overall goals 
of the University. Under this arrangement, it was reported that enforc- 
ing discipline was difficult as it would cost votes during elections. The 
Task Force was informed that elected University officials experienced 
difficulties in leading their colleagues without fear or favour. This has 
resulted in weakening the efficient administration of the University. 
For example, absenteeism, late coming, delayed production of exami- 
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nation and coursework results and general indiscipline occur but go 
unpunished. This has had deleterious effect on the quality of educa- 
tion at the University. Worse, the provision in the Act of election of 
Deans, Director and Heads of Departments “by their Academic Staff 
from  among  their  senior  members”  precludes  otherwise  qualified 
people from competing for these posts. (Taskforce  on  Job  Evaluation, 
Re-organisation of the Staff Structure and Financing of Makerere Univer- 
sity, 2014, p. 61) 
In view of the above, reform is required to minimise the perverse effects 
of electing leaders. The first option that is explicit in the Omaswa Task- 
force Report, is to reform the “…electoral process and the amendment of 
the [Universities and Other Tertiary Institutions] Act so that all University 
Officers are appointed and not elected” (Taskforce  on  Job  Evaluation,  Re- 
organisation of the Staff Structure and Financing of Makerere University, 2014, 
p. 61). This proposal is premised on the idea that only those that aspire 
to political office should be subjected to an electoral process. However, it 
raises a fundamental question: Who should be charged with the responsi- 
bility of appointing leaders? There are three discernible schools of thought 
on this matter. According to the Omaswa Report, this responsibility should 
be vested in the university council. The second school of thought advo- 
cates a dual appointment mechanism. Under this proposal, the governing 
body should appoint leaders except for the vice chancellor, who should 
be appointed by the head of state. The former vice chancellor, Professor 
Ddumba-Ssentamu (September 2012-August 2017) subscribes to the dual 
mechanism: “You cannot vote for a VC [vice chancellor]; it should be the 
president (head of state) to appoint [the VC] because it (office of the vice 
chancellor) is not political” (The  Observer, March 27-28, 2017, p. 4). It is 
arguable whether this proposal would not shift the politics from the uni- 
versity to the national level. Nevertheless, making the head of state the 
appointing authority for the vice chancellor would resurrect state control, 
which was abandoned in favour of steering from a distance, and result in 
accountability problems. There is potential for tension due to the question 
of whether the vice chancellor should be accountable to the (head of) state 
or the (university) council. The final option that is explicit in the Rwen- 
deire Report is to vest responsibility for appointing the vice chancellor in 
the minister responsible for education. The central thread in both reports, 
which is also echoed by the Rwendeire Report, is that the vice chancellor 
should be appointed by the state on the recommendation of the university 
council through an open and competitive process. This would introduce 
merit to the selection process. Saint (2009) identified this mode of appoint- 
ment in countries such as Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Mozambique and Sri Lanka. Saint further identified two variants of this 
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practice: selection of the vice chancellor from a shortlist of three names 
forwarded by the university council; or acceptance or rejection of a single 
recommended candidate. 
Another option could be to vest the power to appoint leaders in the uni- 
versity council but on the recommendation of the vice chancellor. This 
would be in sync with the NPM prescription of letting managers manage. It 
would enable the vice chancellor to identify competent leaders who would 
be reluctant to swim in the dirty political waters at the university. A team 
selected through such a mechanism would be accountable to the vice chan- 
cellor for delivering the strategy. 
The second option, which fits the description of a reform is to maintain 
the status quo; in other words, “no reform”. This viewpoint appeals to a 
section of academics who find the idea of abandoning the electoral system 
offensive. The pro-status quo camp tends to rationalise current practice. 
For example, the principal of one of the colleges is quoted to have said: 
“The principle [of electing leaders] is perfectly fine because it empow- 
ers university employees to have a say on who becomes their leader” but 
hastened to add, “However, in practice, it has become extremely impos- 
sible to have the best leaders to lead this institution (Makerere University) 
because of the nature of the electorate” (The Observer, March 27-28, 2017, 
p. 4). Proponents of maintaining the status quo argue that the solution to 
the unintended consequences of electing leaders does not lie in abandon- 
ing the well-intentioned practice but rather in streamlining the electorate. 
In other words, throwing out the principle would amount to throwing out 
the baby with the bathwater. The principal of a college elaborated: “I think 
its [high] time we paid more attention to the kind of members that sit at 
the senate and the university council. If you have members with a certain 
degree of competency and integrity, the process of election wouldn’t be a 
problem” (The Observer, March 27-28, 2017, p. 4). 
Extant literature (e.g., Eurydice, 2008; Middlehurst, 2004; OECD, 2003; 
Saint, 2009) points to the shift from electing to appointing leaders. This is 
premised on the notion that the procedures for choosing those appointed to 
leadership positions in universities affect institutional performance (Saint, 
2009). Finding lasting solutions to this question requires that consensus 
be reached among the stakeholders in higher education in Uganda. 
In conclusion, stakeholders’ concerns regarding the current shared 
governance framework for public universities in Uganda relate to the sub- 
stance of the framework rather than the framework itself. This suggests 
that the governance framework that comprises the university council, the 
university senate and the administration is fit for purpose and in sync with 
the nature of the academy. Arguably, it is the existence of the university 
council and the academic senate that distinguishes a university from an 
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industry.  Therefore,  any  policy  and  legislative  reforms  should  address 
matters related to the substance and not the form of the shared governance 
framework. This article contributes to the higher education policy dis- 
course in Uganda by advancing a case for reforming the POST-2000 shared 
governance architecture for public universities in the country. 
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